mortgage companies, state and local credit agencies, credit unions and pension funds.
r RE DIT is a scarce commodity. As lenders allocate available hinds on the basis of a van etv of considerations, including price (interest rates), ability to repay, maturity of the loan and costs of servicing, it is generally difficult fbi an outside observer to determine why one loan application is refused while an apparently similar one is accepted.
During the 197Os, banks and thrift institutions were charged with redlining in allocating credit. Many charged that lenders, in essence, drew a line (presumably red) around certain areas on a map and deliberately reduced the supply of mortgage and other credit to residents of those areas. Redlining was credited with both tin fairly discriminating among those seeking credit and hastening the ceonomic decline of the affected areas. Lenders, theoretically, did this because they were shortsighted, bigoted or insensitive to the needs of these mdiviclu als and communities .Ĩ n response to such charges. Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), effective November 6, 1978, to encourage financial institutions to meet the credit needs of their local communities Tb is article discusses redlin lug and examines the CRA experience during the three years of its existence. Since a study by the Council of State Planning Agencies has recommended enactment of Take the~Ione,j and Run! Red!iaiag ui Brooklyn (New York Public Interest Group, Inc., 1976). pp. 13-16 and Redhined: A 'Vatk) a! S n jrc' p 1)1/ ,\a tic)) a / Peaj, let Aetia of Ma rtgage Lear!- a law similar to the CRA, hut aimed at increasing credit to small businesses in the bank's community, this is an appropriate time to review the CRA experience. 2 NI .ARKF~7.TS AN ) Ti I:tĩ.).i :,l. NI N C .lIItCtfl..G1fli.CS' RI :tIc.~.rttr (iVQL'm2diflfT he purchase of a home is typically the largest financial outlay that an individual makes in his ii ktime, usually amounting to two or more years of a buyer's income. Home purchasers generally rely on substantial credit to fAcilitate their purchases since they do not have sufficient savings readily available to buy the home outright.
By mid-1981 total mortgage debt in the country amounted to $1.5 trillion, more than 50 percent greater thim the total federal debt. This mortgage credit was granted by a vast number of diverse lenders. Savings and loan associations beld 34 percent of tin, debt, commercial banks bad 18 percent, life insurance companies carried 9 percent, and federal and related agencies held 8 percent. The remaining 31 percent oF the mortgage debt was distributed among mutual savings banks, mortgage pools or trusts, relatives and other individuals, The broader market reflects the fact that some lenders, such as insurance companies, in searching for the most profitable opportunities, lend in various sections ofthe country, Also, mortgage bankers frequently resell mortgages to institutions situated in other parts of the country to enable them to make additional loans locally. FlEA insurance and the secondary markets further improve the acceptance of mortgages outside the local community. In addition, savings tend to flow from areas of relatively low interest rates to areas of relatively higher interest rates. As a result, there is, in reality, a national mortgage market, bringing competition for mortgages into virtually every locality.
Since lenders are in business to maximize their wealth, it is natural for them to seek the most profitable loans available. It is rational, therefore, in determining whether to grant a loan, for lenders to consider such economic factors as the present and future value ofthe collateral, the income, wealth and other measures of the creditworthiness of the borrower, and the probable collection costs, in addition to the interest rate charged. On the other hand, it is irrational for lenders to refuse to lend for reasons unrelated to the likely profitability of the loan.
Theoretical Objections to the Existence of "Irrational" Redlining
To forego profitable opportunities by discriminating against potential borrowers on the basis of ston-economic criteria is generally considered irrational behavior on the part of lenders. Imposing less favorable terms in one area than another, or refusing to lend altogether, when notjustified by differences in risk or cost, is inconsistent with the self-interestof lenders or borrowers. If private lenders are profit maximizers, non-profitable redlining would be of limited duration.S Although some lenders, at times, may derive satisfaction from denying certain loans for non-economic reasons, competition from other lenders who seek such profitable loans assures that such actions are neither common nor widespread.
Despite its practical drawbacks, many believe that such redlining is common and that laws are needed to correct this abuse. 4 These observers believe that many financial institutions exercise local monopoly power; thus the potential competition to reduce unprofitable redlining is severely limited. Hence, lenders allegedly have sufficient market power to indulge their lending prejudices for a considerable time. Although a lender with sufficient monopoly power can become lax or biased if he chooses, however, most monopolist lenders have pecuniary incentives to make the most profitable loans, incentives that are reinforced when management is accountable to stockholders. An exception, where prejudicial discrimination may be practiced without pecuniary cost, is a monopoly lender already so profitable that it fears public policy actions may be forthcoming if it becomes even more profitable. 5 This does not appear to be a problem for mortgage lenders.
Is There Etidence that Redlining Exists?
The principal method of demonstrating the existence of redlining is to count mortgages made by certain lenders in an inner-city, low-income areaand in a suburban, high-income area for about a year and compare the two figures. Such arguments were supported by data supplied by financial institutions under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. These data, combined with census information on housing, income and population, indicate that low-income areas receive proportionately less credit than other neighborhoods.
However, these studies have serious shortcomings. Most careful analyses have generally been consistent with the implications cited above for profit-maximizing lenders. Two studiesfor Sacramento, Cali torn hi and Louisville, Kentucky demonstrated that arguments advanced to show redlining omitted many important sources ofcredit such as mortgage hankers and private funds .~In an analysis of data provided by Toledo, Ohio, savings and loan associations, the demand for mortgages was also found to be an important omitted factor.Ã study of I" I IA insured mortgage fbreclos ures in six major cities which focused on the risks (costs) of lending on properties in allege ci redl in i ng areas fbund that clifferences in loan terms were based on economic rather than prejudicial factors.°Allegations liv commun ity groups that properties in low-income areas were systematically underappraised were not supported in a study of savings and loan data bar Miami, San Antonio and Toledo.10 On the other band, an examination of denials of mortgage applications hased on a survey of 176 banks by the Comptroller and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FI)IC) found slight evidence of non-economic cliscnmination.
1
An in-depth study of the Rochester. New York, metropolitan area found insufficient evidence to conclude that redlining was a serious prohlem.12 Its authors noted that previous inquiries claiming to find significant amounts of redlining made incomplete surveys of lenders (particularly-mortgage hankers), ignored the effect of rent controls, used time periods too short for meaningful generalizations, ignored the collateral offered and the creditworthiness of borrowers, or did not compare demands for credit by areas.
Den 11is I)in go, hans, ''Re dim jug an ci NI n rtgage Lending In Sacra- Another extensive empirical analysis x-vas made of virtually all home mortgage and home improvement loans granted in Cuvahoga Count, the central county-of the Cleveland area, from 1977 through 1979.13 After controlling for income and other demographic s-ariables, the study concluded that neighborhood racial composition had little impact on either tile total number of deed transfers financed by mortgage loans or total housing-related financing. However, it also appeared that the portion of conventional mortgage financing provided in' banks and savings and loans was signihcantiv lower in integrated and all-black neighborhoods than in all-white neighborhoods. On the other hand, black and racially mixed areas were significantly more likely to be served by mortgage b;uikers offering FHA and \'A financing. Also, banks and savings and loans were much more likely to make home impros-ement loans in these areas.
One can obtain additional evidlencc-that irrational redlining does not exist by looking at the operating history of new banks established primarily to lend in losv-income. areas. Iwenty--six black-owned banks, for example, were established to serve this demand in low-income areas in the last 10 years. Of these new banks, five have tidied, and at least a dozen others were near collapse before other organizations bailed them outi 4 Although minority banks came into existence to deal with specific ininorit credit problems, their lack of sticcess suggests that most creditworthy demands were already being accorumoclated, although other factors such as management and capitalization may also have played a role.
Further tests of banks lending behavior support the profit-maxinization model. One recent study, using data on 30,000 commercial bank consumer loans, tested whether sex discrimination existed in credit allocation by banks.15 The study found no systematic pattern of sex cliscrimniationevei) before the Equal Credit Opportunity' Act was passed. Instead, banks typically behaved as profit maximizers, making loans on equis-alent terms to equally risky customers. regardless of their sex. 
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
Despite theoretical objections and the lack ofevidence thatsuch redlining actually existed, Congress passed the CRA. The congressional action generally reflected the public's sympathy with the anecdotal arguments of those living in blighted areas. The success of community groups in convincing the press and public that lenders were not serving older urban areas was primarily the result of skillful publicity rather than substantial confirming evidence. 18 The act was intended to eliminate irrational redlining in determining whether a loan application is accepted; lenders were still permitted to evaluate applications on rational economic grounds.
The act specifically requires financial institutions to".. . demonstrate thattheir deposit facilities serve the convenience and needs of the communities in which they are chartered to do business." It directs four regulatory agenciesthe Board ofGovernors of the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Fe4eral Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), and the FDICto encourage each institution undertheirjurisdiction to help meet the credit needs of its entire local community.
Under the act, a financial institution is required to adopt a CRA statement, maintain public CRA files and display a CM notice, which includes information on the availability of the institution's CM statement. The CRA statement must include a delineation of the area that comprises the institution's community and a list of principal types of credit that the institution is prepared to extend. The public files must contain any signed comments received from the public about the institution's record of serving the credit needs of its community.
In addition, the CM requires the regulatory agencies to assess regularly each institution's record of meeting the credit needs of its community, including low-to-moderate income neighborhoods, consistent with the safe and sound operation of the institution. These assessments are taken into account in rulings on merger, holding company and other applications by the institution. Also, the CRA offers anyone the opportunity to challenge any merger, holding company or branching expansion 
Protests tinder the CR~t
To date, about 100 protests in opposition to the applications ofbanks and savings and loans on CRA grounds have been filed with the regulatory agencies. Most have been lodged by community organizations, a few have come from the press or individuals, and approximately one-third have been lodged by competitors. Most protests have been against institutions located in or near low-income areas of major cities.
At first, community groups were hesitant about using the CM to challenge applications, perhaps because oftheft unfamiliarity with the operations of financial institutions and regulatory agencies and because most creditworthy demands were being accommodated. Overtime, these organizations have gained experience and become more active. A number ofprotests have been supported by considerable information; these have frequently been instrumental in gaining concessions from financial institutions.' 1
Although there are severaltechnical requirements in the CM, such as displaying a CM notice in the lobby, protesters have had little complaint concerning them. The chiefissue raised in most protests is the failure of the financial institution to serve adequately the housing-related credit requirements of low-income neighborhoods, especially those composed ofminorities or those with a shifting racial balance, These complaints typically contend thatthe lending institution systematicallyrefuses or severely limits credit to certain neighborhoods because of location, age ofproperty or general conditions in the area, with little regard to the creditworthiness of the applicant. Congress provided little specific guidance in the act as to what is satishxctorv or unsatisfiuctorv performance in regard to conimunity reinvestment. The act does not explain how a financial institutions community should be selected, how credit needs are to he determined, what constitutes low-and moderate-income neighborhoods, or to what extent the act was to he interpreted by considering the costs, liquidity, safety and profitability of the lender. Since the provisions of the act are vague, regulatory agencies have hat! to both enfbrce the act and interpret it as well.
Protests also have been registered on other grounds. These include: the institutions' failure to advertise the availability of credit in the lower income neighborhoods; a low level of involvement with government programs, particularly the Small Business Administration and the student loan programs; excessively restrictive mortgage loan policies, such as larger down payments than other
The regulatory agencies invited the public to suggest how to interpret and implement the act in a series of hearings held in cities across the nation. 18
fo provide a focus for the hearings, a number of questions that the statute raised were included with the public notice of the hearings.~Consequently, the implementation of the act began modestly and cautiously and has been gradually formulated over time. The agencies, evolving their own standards on a case-by-case basis, have examined a variety of evidence in evaluating a lender's CRA performance. 2°U nder the CRA, regulatory agencies have a number of responsibilities. They must regularly assess each lending institution's record of performance in helping to meet its community credit needs. This assessment or inspection covers both the technical compliance with regulations and a qualitative evaluation of the institution's overall performance in serving the credit requirements of its community. The regulatory agencies have agreed on a uniform rating system to provide a consistent application of the act. However, they assigned no explicit weights to the as essnu nt factors since the x belies c d that ans s itch xx eighting would consti am an institution re spo n e s to local crc clit dc m and s.
A significant 'tspc ct of the CRA inspe ction is rn ox cr dl jut 1 'mental cx thi mtio i of a lenclei 's pc rfbrni'rnce in me tin" th crc cli t demands of its cornmun it\ . CRA in pt c'tion s of a g'xen bank occui ron 'hIs cx r\ 12 to 18 month and!, bs and l'trgc' h ix rex c 'mIt c 1 that the banks sc rccl the cm edit need of then communitie (tablt 1)21 Lx en in cas s of unsati siactom x pcr{oi manc'c most pote nt'al borroxx crc xx eie plotectedl bx othei compe titix c' in stitutions in the uca.
Regulatory agencies take into account both the CRA assessments and actions taken by the lender to bring about future improvement when they evaluate an institution's application fhr a charter, branch, office relocation, deposit insurance, merger or acquisition. The agencies will deny any application ifthey judge that the hank or savings and loan has not complied with the substantive prov-isions of the CRA.
Al so, since the public may challenge a financial institutions application on CRA grounds, the agencies must evaluate the merits of CRA protests and objections when considering an institutions application. To aid protestors, the Federal Reserve System issued! Regulation BB, which lists the criteria the Board of Governors considers in evaluating the CRA record of a bank (see insert). In addition, each Reserve Bank has appointed a Community Affitirs Officer whose responsibilities include advising ''Glenn Canner. ''The Comusunity Reinvestment Act: A Second Progress Repm't,'' Fec/era! Rcserce Bit Iletio (November 1981 
Board of Governors, commitments have played a role in seven.Ĩ
t is the explicit policy of the regulatory agencies to encourage discussion between applicants and protestants to help resolve or nanow their differences. Anumber ofsuch discussions have been held, and, in six protested cases decided by the Board of Governors, a privately negotiated agreement between the parties was a factor in resolving the problem. These discussions resulted in commitments by financialinstitutions to change lendingpractices and other policies. At times, in private agreements between the parties, lenders have gone much further than the act requires, for example, by allocating specific amounts of mortgage credit in certain depressed areas at interest rates of Vs percentage point below the prevailing market rate"
EVALUATION OF THE CRA
The CRA has been controversial from its inception. Prior to its passage, community groups claimed that irrational redlining was common, while financial institutions asserted that they were meeting neighborhood credit demands consistent with prudent lending practices. There is little agreement, however, on the extent ofthe problem, though most careful studies have found little discrimination in lending. Consequently, the desirability of the act and the role, if any, that it should play in credit markets is still in doubt after three years. The American Bankers Association has requested Congress to repeal the CRA.~' Even if some managers offinancial intermediaries were willing to forego profits to satisfr their prejudices, the sizable numbers of lenders operating in most local markets, especially in the major cities where redlining is alleged to be greatest, makes it unlikely that many actual cases of credit unavailability on competitive terms would be observed. The experience of the last three years has been consistent with many economists'views that the lack of credit availability to borrowers caused by irrational redlining is uncommon. Yet, also as expected, the act has placed a burden on lenders, which has caused The philosophy incorporated in the CRA of requiring each financial institution to give preference in its lending to those in their local community can be questioned. Financial institutions, their stockholders and their depositors are clearly better off if funds are loaned where the interest rates are.higher, regardless of location. Similarly, the prospects for increased investment and production are enhanced when credit is allocated efficiently. Competition among lenders, the borrowers' best protection against prejudiced lenders, is strengthened when financial institutions seek to make the best loans possible.
Some analysts regarded the passage of the act as a major step toward governmental allocation of credit. Such concern still exists, even though the regulatory agencies deny that the act and its enforcement allocates credit.~In &ct, the Federal Reserve has stated that it will not endorse any agreements to allocate credit. 2 Yet, when financial institutions desire favorable rulings on applications, and, as part ofthis process, must demonstrate that the credit needs of low-to-moderate income areas are being adequately served, credit will be allocated differently, if for no other reason than to increase the probability of a favorable ruling. Thus, some financial institutions have adjusted their lending policies to grant more credit in low-to-moderate income areas in their communities.
Another result of the act is that financial institutions have undertaken large projects in which financial risks can be shared. One example ofsuch efforts was in Springfield, Massachusetts, where 11 local commercial and savings banks and two insurance companies combined development efforts to revi-"The Federal Reserve has stated, "Although CRA Is directed at the problem ofmeeting sound community credit needs, it was not intended to establish aregulatory influence on the allocation ofcredits. In Implementing the Act, the Board has acted on the belief that banks are in the best position to assess the credit needs of their own local communities
Federal Reserve
System, Community Reinvestment Act, Information Statement, January 3, 1980, p. 1. 9The Board) ".. is aware that many banks have on their own initiative adopted special purpose credit programs, or pilot programs to test new credit offerings. The Board does not wish to discourage these eflbrts However, the Board will closely scrutinize any agreements to ascertain that they are not inconsistent with the safety and soundness ofthe bank involved, and do not establish a preference for credit extensions inconsistent with evenhanded treatment ofborrowers S.." Federal Reserve System, Community Reinvestment Act, Infonnatlon Statement, January 3, 1980. p. 3. talize the downtown area. 27 The longer-run anticompetitive implications of creating what are essentially lending cartels, however, may be unfitvorable for borrowers, An evaluation ofthe net impact on the community of CRA-type agreements and commitments by financial institutions to community groups is difficult. Perhaps borrowers in low-to-moderate income areas have received somewhat more credit than they would have otherwise received. The costs to depositors, stockholders and other potential borrowers, however, are largely hidden. To the extent thatcontacts with community groups improve the banker's knowledge of loan opportunities and risks, and generates new sources of sound loans at current market rates, such activities improve the financial system while removing some inequities. To the extent that bankers engage in these activities merely to create harmonious public relations, they merely increase the costs of financial intermediation The costs imposed by the CRA on financial intermediation have run into many millions of dollars The expense of adopting formal policy statements, appointing community relations officers, familiarizing employees with the legal requirements, holding meetings with community groups, record keeping and reporting must be financed by each lending institution. The administrative costs of the regulatory agencies in periodically assessing each financial institution's CRA performance and in applying CRA standards in the review of each application is a burden on taxpayers. A protested CRA application generates the additional costs of preparing a defense and often delays for six months or more the outcome of the application.
Some have expressed concern that the CRA eventually will reduce the supply of credit in lowincome neighborhoods. A study prepared for the FHLBB found that the act shifted housing-related credit into certain central-city areas, but only in the short run.~The regulations also raise costs more sharply for lenders serving these localities, which could eventually result in a reduction in the supply of such credit. With less credit available, it becomes more expensive, adversely affecting the low-income areas. Also, when allegation of CRA violations come from competitive institutions seeking to prevent or delay a market entrant, the flow of credit to the local area is impeded, an outcome presumably opposite to the act's intent. "Cuttentag and Wachter, "Redlining and Public Policy"
